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I. INTRODUCTION
Surprisingly, very little has been written on the Florida widow's
statutory right to elect dower.' Perhaps because the Florida dower interest
patently qualifies for the federal estate tax marital deduction, nothing
heretofore has been written on whether it technically qualifies. To real
property and probate lawyers the qualification of the dower right for the
marital deduction is an extremely important factor to consider when
counselling the widow: Is it to her advantage to elect dower in lieu of
what she would receive under her husband's will in the case of testacy or
under the law of descent and distribution in the case of intestacy?
The significance of this question becomes readily apparent when pre-
sented with the following illustration. At the death of Mr. Rich, a long-time
Florida resident, wealthy farmer, and real estate investor, both his probate
estate and his taxable estate for federal estate tax purposes approximates
$2,000,000. By will he left his wife cash and securities worth $50,000 and
Florida real estate valued at $450,000. Soon after the death of her hus-
band, Mrs. Rich learns that it may be to her advantage to relinquish the
$500,000 interest under her husband's will and instead elect to take a
statutory dower interest which, in her case, would amount to $666,667.
The choice appears to be a simple one-500,000 by will or $666,667 by
electing dower. The possibility of an additional $166,667 receivable under
the dower election is tempting only so long as the marital deduction is not
lost. The $500,000 under the will qualifies for the marital deduction and
passes tax-free but the dower interest, if taxable, would be worth only
$415,6002 (some $84,400 less than if she had not elected to take dower at
* This paper was awarded first prize in the statewide Florida Lawyers' Title Guaranty
Fund Essay Contest.
** J.D., U. of Miami, 1967; presently, Teaching Fellow and Candidate for LL.M. in
Taxation at New York University. Former Associate Editor, University of Miami Law
Review.
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 731.34-.35 (1965).
2. FLA. STAT. § 731.34 (1965):
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all!). In economic terms, whether or not the Florida dower interest
qualifies for the marital deduction is a most important question to resolve.
It is the purpose of this paper to present an analysis of the Florida
and federal law pertaining to dower and the marital deduction. The
schematic presentation shall include a review of the Florida dower statute,
some introductory definitions of key marital deduction terms, and an ex-
planation of the effect that the date of death application of the terminable
interest rule has had upon the marital deduction, and the impact it has
had upon dower in Florida.
II. BRIEF SUMMARY OF FLORIDA DOWER
In general, the Florida dower statutes provides that in lieu of what
the widow would have received under her husband's will or under the law
of descent and distribution,' she shall have the right to elect a fee interest
in both the real and personal property owned by her husband at the time
of his death.' The dower interest must be affirmatively elected in a writing
which must be filed within nine months after the first publication of the
notice to creditors or within seventy days from the date of final judgment
determining the last outstanding claim affecting the estate whichever
comes later.' Since 1965, the absolute right to elect dower has been per-
sonal to the widow, that is, it is exercisable solely by her and is extin-
guished upon her death in the event that she has not elected prior thereto,7
except that, in the event that the widow is under a disability, her guardian
may elect to take dower on her behalf subject to the approval of the
county judge.8 The guardian only has the authority to initiate a petition
requesting dower, but he does not have an unconditional right to elect for
her.' The actual election can only be made by the county judge.10
In any case where the dower interest of the widow shall have the effect of increas-
ing the estate tax, her dower shall be ratably liable with the remainder of the estate
for the estate taxes due by the estate of her deceased husband ....
On a $2,000,000 taxable estate the amount owing is $753,200; one-third of which ($251,067),
is attributable to the widow's dower interest.
3. FLA. STAT. §§ 731.34-.35 (1965).
4. FLA. STAT. f§ 731.10 (1965).
5. Fr.A. STAT. § 731.34 (1965).
6. FLA. STAT. § 731.35(1)-(2) (1965).
7. Prior to 1965 anyone who had a beneficial interest in the estate of the deceased widow
could elect, with the approval of the county judge, to take dower on her behalf if she died
within the time allowed for the filing of the election without having done so. FLA. STAT. §
731.35(3) (1963).
8. FLA. STAT. § 731.35(3) (1965).
9. Edwards v. Edwards, 106 So.2d 558 (Fla. 1958); First Nat'l Bank v. McDonald, 100
Fla. 675, 130 So. 596 (1930) In re Estate of Pearson, 192 So.2d 89 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
10. See cases cited note 9 supra; FLA. STAT. § 731.35(3) (1965) requires the judge to
base his grant or denial of the petition upon a consideration of the best interests of the
widow.
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III. INTRODUCTORY TAX DEFINITIONS
Section 2056 of the Internal Revenue Code of 195411 contains the
rules and limitations by which a maximum of fifty percent of the value of
a decedent's estate (after the deduction of section 2053 administration
expenses and section 2054 uninsured casualty and theft losses incurred
during the administration of the estate) may pass without tax to the
surviving spouse. 2 The initial Code limitation upon the allowance of the
deduction is that an interest in property must "pass" from the decedent
to his widow. 13 For purposes of this requirement, a dower interest is de-
fined by Code section 2056 (e) (3) as an interest in property passing from
the decedent to his widow. It is important to note that this definition does
not mean that all dower interests automatically qualify for the marital
deduction. On the contrary, this subsection is strictly limited to the
"passing" requirement. It has no application to the limitation in section
2056(b) commonly known as the terminable interest rule. This latter re-
striction disallows the deduction of life estates and other annuity-like
interests
where, on the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an event or
contingency, or on the failure of an event or contingency to
occur, the interest passing to the surviving spouse will terminate
or fail.1
4
An interest which falls within this classification is aptly known as a ter-
minable interest,"8 which, solely for the purpose of this paper, shall be
considered the only nondeductible interest.'6
Two terms between which a little understood, but critical distinction
must be made are "property" and "interest in property" (hereinafter
generally referred to as an "interest"). In the past the distinction has not
often been recognized, so that misconceptions among judges and practi-
tioners have been prevalent. Treasury Regulation section 20.2056(b)-
1(e)(2) recognizes the distinction and refers to "property" as "the
underlying property in which various interests exist." In other words, the
11. Formerly INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 812(e).
12. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(c). For the purposes of this paper the surviving
spouse shall be referred to in the feminine gender.
13. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(a).
14. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b)(1). For the purposes of this paper only the
general rule quoted in the text shall be under consideration.
15. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-i(b) (1958).
16. It should. be noted that in actuality not all terminable interests are nondeductible.
However, herein, it shall be assumed that, unless stated otherwise, all terminable interests
are nondeductible. As stated in Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-1(c) (1) (1958), .a property interest
which constitutes a terminable interest is nondeductible only if:
(i) Another interest in the. same property passed from the decedent to some
other person for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth, and
(ii) By reason of its passing, the other person or his heirs or assigns may possess
or enjoy any part of the property after the termination or failure of the spouse's
interest.
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term means the assets of the decedent's estate. The Senate Finance Com-
mittee which reported on the marital deduction prior to its enactment in
1948'" defined an "interest" as "the quality and quantum of ownership
by the surviving spouse or other person, in particular property."', Simply
put, an "interest" is the right to receive particular property in the dece-
dent's estate. Both the underlying property and the interest or rights to
receive it must circumvent the provisions of the terminable interest rule
for a marital deduction to be allowed. 9
IV. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ENUNCIATES TERMINABILITY
In 1964 in Jackson v. United States,2 ° the United States Supreme
Court held that the California widow's allowance was a terminable in-
terest which did not qualify for the marital deduction because the widow
did not have an indefeasible interest in the allowance at the moment of
her husband's death.2' Basically, the Court laid down the rule that for all
interests which are sought to be allowed under the marital deduction, ter-
minability must be determined as of the moment of the decedent's death."
The case resolved a conflict in the lower courts on whether the order
of a probate court granting a widow's allowance could be related back for
federal estate tax purposes so that it could be said that it was indefeasibly
vested at the date of the husband's death.23 But this was said to be a mis-
17. The marital deduction was enacted by Congress in 1948 to equate the estate tax
effect in common law and community property law states. The desired end was that in the
former states one-half of the estate of the first decedent should be able to pass without tax
to the surviving spouse such as is essentially the case in the latter states where each spouse
owns one-half of the community or marital property. See Surrey, Federal Taxation of the
Family-The Revenue Act of 1948, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1097; Anderson, The Marital Deduc-
tion and Equalization under the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes Between Common Law and
Community Property States, 54 MIcn. L. REV. 1087.
18. S. REP. No. 1013, Part 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1948).
19. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 1§ 2056(b) (1).
20. 376 U.S. 503 (1964).
21. On appeal the taxpayer argued that $42,000 of the $72,000 paid to the widow should
qualify for the marital deduction because as to this amount there was nothing terminable
about it from the date of the probate court decree some fourteen months after the husband's
death. The decree ordered the payment to her of $3,000 a week starting with the date the
husband died. Under California law the right terminates if the widow remarries or dies prior
to securing an order for a widow's allowance. Amounts accrued but unpaid at the time the
widow remarries or dies are payable to her or her estate, but the right to future payments
abates at the moment of the change in her status.
22. Id. at 508, citing Bookwalter v. Lamar, 323 F.2d 664 (8th Cir. 1963) ; United States
v. Mappes, 318 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1963); Commissioner v. Estate of Ellis, 252 F.2d 109
(3d Cir. 1958) ; Starrett v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 163 (1st Cir. 1955) ; Estate of Frank
Sbicca, 35 T.C. 96 (1960). The Court noted that the six months survival provision in Code
,section 2056(b) (3) is an exception to this rule.
23. The relation back or date of decree approach was applied in United States v. First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 297 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1961); Estate of Michael G. Rudnick, 36
T.C. 1021 (1961) ; Estate of Margaret R. Gale, 35 T.C. 215 (1960). The date of death ap-
proach was applied in Bookwalter v. Lamar, 323 F.2d 664 (8th Cir. 1963) ; United States
v. Mappes, 318 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1963) ; United States v. Quivey, 292 F.2d 252 (8th Cir.
1961); Estate of Cunha v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1960); Commissioner v.
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application of the terminability rule.24 Principally, this approach disre-
garded the interest-property dichotomy and simply made the determina-
tion rest upon whether the property passing to the widow was indefeasibly
vested in her at the time of the award.28
In Jackson the Supreme Court determined that the date of death was
the time Congress26 had intended for terminability to be tested. In adopt-
ing this time approach, the Court mandated that under section 2056 (b) a
determination must be made whether the interest or right to receive par-
ticular property of the estate was by its nature terminable. Therefore,
for federal estate tax purposes a retroactive court order does not change
the defeasible nature of the interest.2 1 Under the test set out by the court,
an "interest in property" qualifies for the marital deduction only if it is
vested indefeasibly, unconditionally, and noncontingently29 at the time of
the death of the decedent. Therefore, in the event of the death of the sur-
viving spouse as of any moment of time following the decedent's death,
the interest must remain as an asset of the survivor's estate. 0
In applying the terminable interest rule to the interest passing to the
widow at the moment of her husband's death, it must be noted that the
terms "vested" and "indefeasible" cannot be equated carte blanche.8
Standing alone, the former is a state property law concept82 which may or
may not be synonymous with the federal estate tax law concept of a right
which is absolutely exercisable by the surviving spouse or the heirs of her
estate.3" In this regard the Senate Finance Committee commented that the
interest is terminable regardless of whether under state law it "is con-
sidered as a vested interest subject to divestment or is a contingent in-
terest."84 The Supreme Court in Jackson, however, stated that local law
will determine whether such interest may lapse because of time or the
Estate of Ellis, 252 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958) ; Starrett v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 163 (1st
Cir. 1955) ; Estate of Frank Sbicca, 35 T.C. 96 (1960).
24. Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503, 508 (1964).
25. The Court rejected the idea that the later the award of the widow's allowance the
greater the amount that would be indefeasibly vested and therefore deductible under the date
of decree approach. Id. at 507-508.
26. S. Ra'. No. 1013, Part 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1948) cited in Jackson v. United
States, 376 U.S. at 508.
27. 376 U.S. at 508.
28. Id. at 507.
29. Id. at 508. The Senate Report indicates the overlapping of conditions and contin-
gencies by declaring that "[t]he occurrence of a contingency includes the ending of a con-
dition." S. RaP. No. 1013, Part 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. at 7 (1948).
30. Rev. Rul. 83, 1953-1 Cum. BULL. 395 was the first official interpretation to denote
the requirement of inheritability of interests at the date of the decedent's death.
31. The term "vested" may be used to describe the nature of retroactive rights under
state law, while the term "indefeasible" is descriptive of the nature of rights under state law
existing at the very moment of the decedent's death.
32. State property law often refers to "vested" interests as a short form of interests
that are "vested" subject to divestment.
33. Rev. Rul. 83, note 30 supra.
34. S. REP. No. 1013, Part 2, 80th Con&., 2d Ses . 7 (1948).
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occurrence or non-occurrence of an event or contingency.85 Therefore, by
a joint state-federal law application, the nature and characteristics of in-
terests arising under state law are to be determined by recourse to the law
of such state, while their classification for the application of the termin-
able interest rule are to be determined by federal law.
The strict language in Jackson,88 where the Court cited the examples
in the legislative history,3 7 makes it clear that the terminability test is to
be all-encompassing. Therefore, at the date of death, the mere possibility
that a contingency or event may occur or fail will make the interest non-
deductible. As expressed by the Sixth Circuit, "[t]he critical factor in
applying the terminable interest rule is the possibility under state law of
the failure of an interest rather than the actual failure.""8 Thus, it is clear
that it is not the actual failure but the theoretical possibility of failure
upon which the interest will be tested. 9
Kendall v. United States4" well illustrated the theoretical failure of
any personal right passing to the surviving spouse which is lost upon a
change in the personal status for which the interest depends. 4 In this case
the district court limited the husband's interest that qualified for the
marital deduction to his indefeasibly vested one-third interest in his wife's
personal estate, even though the probate court had directed the executor
to pay the husband two-thirds of the personal estate. After noting that
under Vermont law the husband's right to receive the additional interest
was extinguishable at his death, the district court stated that "[s]ince
anything assigned to the surviving spouse over one-third [was] personal
to the surviving spouse, it would be a terminable interest, and thus would
not qualify for the marital deduction. Jackson v. United States.142 It
should be noted that in this case the interest in excess of the minimum
statutory amount was likewise made terminable because of the discretion
of the probate court to award the additional interest. The discretion sub-
jected the interest to a proscribed contingency 43 which caused it to fall into
the terminable interest classification.
In the past the theoretical failure questions has also arisen in the
35. 376 U.S. at 506. See also Estate of Cunha v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 292 (9th Cir.
1960).
36. 376 U.S. at 510.
37. Citing the examples in S. REP. No. 1013, Part 2 at 10, 11, 15, see quote in text
accompanying note 64 infra. The terminable interest provision "is intended to be all en-
compassing with respect to various kinds of contingencies and conditions." Id. at 7.
38. Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. United States, 353 F.2d 930, 931 (6th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 939 (1966).
40. 1966-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 86,312, 17 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 1413 (D. Vt. 1966).
41. See Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503, 506-507, (1964), where the Court pre-
sages that all personal interests are terminable because of their defeasible or conditional
nature.
42. Kendall v. United States, note 40 supra, 1966-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,313, 17 Am.
Fed. Tax R. 2d at 1414.
43. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (1).
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context of whether an interest is terminable if under state law the sur-
viving spouse is required to make a timely and appropriate election. It has
been uniformly held that the invocation of formal legal procedures as a
prerequisite to the enforcement of state created rights does not make the
interest terminable; 44 otherwise, all elective statutory rights would be
precluded from qualifying for the marital deduction. Certainly, this was
not the intent of Congress when it provided in the Code4" that dower and
statutory interests in lieu thereof satisfy the passing requirement. Ostensi-
bly, a time limit on the right to elect a dower interest will be treated as a
mere formal limitation outside the scope of the terminable interest rule.4
Before turning to Florida law, one further point on federal law de-
mands comment. It has been suggested by one estate planner4 7 that an
end run around the terminable interest rule can be made by including in
the husband's will alternative bequests in the following form: under Part I,
the widow shall receive the husband's entire estate if at his death she will
execute an agreement to devise her whole estate, including any assets re-
ceived under the husband's will, to their children (in essence a nonde-
ductible life estate in the widow); alternatively, under Part II, the widow
shall receive the dower interest provided by statute if she fails to execute
the agreement. 8 The purpose of these provisions is to qualify the ter-
minable life estate up to the extent of the smaller nonterminable interest
that the widow would have received had she chose to take under the will.
Example 8 of Treasury Regulations section 20.2056(b)-i (g) is the author-
ity that allegedly supports this device. It provides that to the extent that
the widow is the residuary beneficiary of her husband's estate, that pro-
portionate amount of a terminable widow's allowance will constitute a de-
ductible interest since that part of the allowance not received by the
widow during her lifetime will pass to her estate.49
44. Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. United States, 353 F.2d 930, 931 (6th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 939 (1966). First Nat'l Exchange Bank v. United States, 335 F.2d 91
(4th Cir. 1964) ; United States v. Hiles, 318 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1963) ; Dougherty v. United
States, 292 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1961) ; United States v. Crosby, 257 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1958),
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 897 (M.D.N.C. 1964).
45. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(e) (3).
46. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(g)(4) (1958) recognizes that limitations of a formal
nature will not disqualify an interest such as where the exercise of a power of appointment
in the surviving spouse is conditioned upon reasonable notice or that such exercise must be
in a particular form.
47. Paper presented by Richard B. Covey, Recent Developments Concerning Gift and
Estate Taxation-1966, First Annual Estate Planning Institute, Univ. of Miami at 67.109,
1-39, January 11, 1967.
48. It would appear that Part II would be of no effect under state law because by its
nature the widow's statutory dower right cannot be altered or abridged by such unilateral
action. Since the provision ostensibly would not provide the widow with any interest that
she will not be entitled to under state law there is little basis upon which to give it signif-
icance for federal estate tax purposes. Nevertheless, since this arguemnt was not raised in
Allen v. United States, 359 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1966), wherein a like alternative bequest
provision was in issue, it shall be assumed arguendo that Part II would have significance
for federal estate tax purposes.
49. This theory has one main flaw-namely that Example 8 is applicable only to those
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For all of its appeal, this device would appear to have overlooked
that part of the passing requirement 0 which precludes a substitution of
interests passing to the widow such that if the particular interest passing
to her were to fail to circumnavigate the terminable interest rule the alter-
native interest relinquished could "pass" in its stead. Treasury Regulation
section 20.2056(e)-2(c) well illustrates the effect of an election upon the
determination of which interest passes:
If the surviving spouse elects to take under the will or other in-
strument, then the dower or other property interests relin-
quished by her is not considered as having "passed from the
decedent to his surviving spouse" . . . and the interest taken
under the will or other instrument is considered as having so
passed.51
In Allen v. United States52 the Second Circuit refused to look at this
alternative bequest device as a whole, reasoning that Part I must be
examined separately from Part II.
The theory upon which the alternate bequest device is premised is
also in conflict with the ratio decidendi of the commuted dower cases.
53
These cases have arisen where state law provides that in lieu of taking
under her husband's will the widow may choose between a dower interest
consisting of a fee in one-third of the husband's personalty and a life
estate in one-third of his realty, or a like dower interest in personalty but
as to his realty an outright cash interest measured by the commuted or
actuarial value of her life estate. It has been uniformly held that where
the widow elects to take commuted dower, the whole interest qualifies for
the marital deduction, whereas if she were to elect dower proper the life
estate portion of her interest would not qualify. 4 Thus, if by statute the
widow is given alternative dower rights it is the interest that she elects
that is deemed to have passed.55
situations where payment of a widow's allowance acts as an advancement on the underlying
qualifying interest. This application of Example 8 is noted in Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(a)
(1958) (last two sentences).
50. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(a).
51. (Emphasis added). The second sentence of this regulation subsection similarly treats
the converse situation where the surviving spouse elects to take a statutory interest in lieu
of taking under the will. In this case the dower interest is considered as having passed.
52. 359 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1966). The decision was criticized by Richard B. Covey, note
47 supra, a proponent of the alternate bequest device.
53. Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. United States, 353 F.2d 930, 931 (6th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 939 (1966) ; First Nat'l Exchange Bank v. United States, 335 F.2d 91 (4th
Cir. 1964) ; United States v. Hiles, 318 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1963) ; Dougherty v. United States,
292 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1961) ; United States v. Crosby, 257 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1958);
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 897 (M.D.N.C. 1964);
National Bank v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 907 (E.D. Va. 1963) ; Moore v. United States,
214 F. Supp. 603 (W.D. Ky. 1963).
54. See cases cited note 53 supra.
55. Until now, the government has not raised the defeasibility issue in those cases
where under state law the right to elect commuted dower is personal to the widow and
terminates at her death. Nor has it as yet argued that where the right to elect the corn-
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V. APPLICATION OF FEDERAL TAX LAW TO FLORIDA DOWER
The essential nature and characteristic of Florida dower having been
set forth previously, we shall now proceed to determine whether the
nature of the interest brings it within the proscription of the terminable
interest rule. Since the whole dower interest passing to the widow is in
fee, the property both real and personal, may qualify for the marital de-
duction."6
Thus, under Florida law, the only possible statutory bar to the de-
duction is the terminability of the interest or right to elect dower. Two
statutory limitations on the interest are that the election must be affirma-
tively made in writing and filed within a limited time. These requirements
do not act as proscribed conditions upon the interest because they are
mere formal limitations upon the right 7 which fall outside the scope of
the terminable interest rule.
A third statutory limitation on the interest is that during the period
in which to elect dower the right can only be exercised by the widow. By
definition, this personal nature of the right causes it to lapse at the
widow's death. 8 As such it carries the terminable interest taint of de-
feasibility"9 since at the time of the husband's death (the moment at which
the terminable interest test is applied) a theoretical possibility"° exists
that the right would be terminated by the death of the widow prior to her
having elected.
A fourth statutory limitation on the interest is that if the widow is
incompetent at the time of her husband's death, or becomes incompetent
during the period of election, the dower right is subject to the discretion-
ary award of the county judge. The interest of the incompetent widow is
therefore terminable because it is subject to a proscribed condition."' As
with a competent widow, the death of an incompetent widow extinguishes
an unexercised right of election, even when the guardian has already filed
a petition for dower and only the official award is lacking. 2
In summary, the Florida dower interest is terminable twice over be-
muted dower interest is conditional upon the approval of the probate court the interest is
terminable.
56. Assuming that Code section 2056(b) (1) (A) and (B), as well as the other limita-
tions in this section, do not control.
57. See text accompanying notes 44 and 46 supra.
58. Bibb v. Bickford, 149 So.2d 592 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
59. Kendall v. United States, 1966-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 86,312, 17 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1413
(D. Vt. 1966); United States v. Edmondson, 331 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1964). See Jackson
v. United States, 376 U.S. 503, 506-507.
60. See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
61. INT. REV. CODE Op 1954, § 2056(b)(1). The possibility that the widow may be-
come incompetent during the time to elect, and thereby lose her absolute right of election,
has the effect of subjecting her interest to a terminable condition.
62. In re Estate of Pearson, 192 So.2d 89 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
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cause at the crucial time of the husband's death the right to elect is both
defeasible and conditional.
It is no answer for the die-hard to say that Congress could not one
moment have declared that a dower interest may qualify for the marital
deduction and then the next moment have in fact taken it away by making
nondeductible the personal dower interests afforded by nearly all states."3
Nor is it an answer to say that in enacting the terminable interest pro-
visions, Congress sought only to assure that interests deducted from the
first decedent's estate would not also escape taxation in the estate of the
surviving spouse. As declared by the Supreme Court of the United States:
[T]he determinative factor is not taxability to the surviving
spouse but terminability as defined by the statute . . . . [T]he
device of the marital deduction which Congress chose to achieve
uniformity was knowingly hedged with limitations, including
the terminable-interest rule. These provisions may be imperfect
devices to achieve the desired end, but they are the means which
Congress chose. To the extent it was thought desirable to modify
the rigors of the terminable-interest rule, exceptions to the rule
were written into the Code. Courts should hesitate to provide
still another exception by straying so far from the statutory
64language ....
VI. EFFECTS ON POST-MORTEM PLANNING
From the standpoint of the Florida widow, the disqualification of her
terminable dower interest may greatly burden her with an appreciable
estate tax liability since, by statute, 5 the taxable interest which she elects
is ratably liable with the remainder of the estate for the taxes due by the
estate of her deceased husband. As a result of this tax liability the widow
may be faced with a severe liquidity problem if the nature of the property
that she receives via her dower election is not both readily and practicably
saleable. Forced sales may cause the widow to suffer heavy financial losses
in an attempt to raise the cash necessary for the estate taxes due from her
interest. Thus, no longer will a larger pre-tax terminable dower interest in-
variably appear more attractive than a smaller tax-free testamentary
bequest.
From the standpoint of the estate, the election of the taxable dower
interest will require the executor to seek contribution from the widow for
the estate tax owing on her interest. The work of an executor may be
eased by the unattractiveness of a taxable dower interest since the widow's
63. The legislative history expressly declares that if the dower interest of the surviving
spouse is a terminable interest the marital deduction cannot be allowed. S. REP. No. 1013,
Part 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1948).
64. Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503, 510 (1964) (footnotes omitted) (em-
phasis added).
65. FLA. STAT. § 73134 (1965).
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failure to exercise her right will prevent the estate from being overturned
by an unexpected election.
VII. PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF FLORIDA STATUTE
Section 731.35(3)
Unmistakably, the controlling factor bearing on an amendment of the
Florida dower statute should be the desire to statutorily secure for the
widow the maximum potential benefits that the interest will afford. This
goal can be achieved only with a dower interest capable of qualifying for
the marital deduction. To qualify the Florida dower interest, two changes
must be made. First, to rectify its present defeasible nature, the right of
election must be made inheritable and unqualifiedly exercisable by the
personal representative. Second, the conditional right of the guardian of
an incompetent widow to elect dower on her behalf must be made absolute.
A failure to make both of these changes will only perpetuate the inimical
terminable character of the interest.
Of the two recommendations, the latter would appear to be the less
objectionable innovation because just as the county judge is commanded
to act on behalf of the incompetent widow's best interests,6 so too is the
guardian, as a fiduciary, commanded to serve her best interests. The same
result can be accomplished by omitting the purposeless super-fiduciary
judicial election and in its stead bestowing an abosolute right of election
in the guardian. If ever the county judge entertains a notion of infidelity
by the guardian, he may use the remedies normally applied in any fiduciary
situation-increase the fiduciary's bond, appoint a co-fiduciary, or re-
move him.
It is to be expected that those who favor dower as a right personal
to the widow will find the first proposal most objectionable. These per-
sonal right proponents can strongly argue that the suggested statutory
modification subverts the limited purpose of the statute, namely to insure
ample provision for the widow's personal needs and comfort.6 7 They may
think of the proposal as an undermining of the spirit of the statute be-
cause it will permit a timely right of election, unexercised at the widow's
death, to possibly pass to her creditors and distant relatives. Judge Dowl-
ing, in his article Dower in Florida,8 suggests that it would be inequitable
for the dower right to be thrown open to the widow's creditors and col-
lateral kin, in preference to the close relatives of her deceased husband
and his lawful creditors.69
However uncompromising as this argument may appear, sight must
66. See note 10 supra.
67. In re Estate of Pearson, 192 So.2d 89 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
68. 31 FLA. B.J. 345 (1957).
69. Id. at 348.
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not be lost of the fact that the first and foremost concern should be with
what the widow actually receives in the settlement of her husband's es-
tate.7" As stated above, for the widow to obtain, dollar-wise, the greatest
economic benefits possible, the Florida dower statute must be amended
so that the interest elected thereunder may qualify for the marital deduc-
tion. It is with this uppermost in mind that the following proposed statute
is offered:
The guardian of a widow suffering under disabilities may, at any
time during which the widow might have done so, file an election
on behalf of the widow to take dower in lieu of the provisions of
the will of her husband or under the law of descent and distribu-
tion. If a widow shall die prior to the expiration of the time al-
lowed for the filing of her election to take dower in lieu of the
provisions of the will of her husband or under the law of descent
and distribution, and shall not have filed such election, the
same may be filed at any time before the expiration of such
period by any person who has a beneficial interest in the estate
of such deceased widow. The timely right to elect dower shall be
indefeasibly vested in the widow from the moment of her hus-
band's death; and during her lifetime shall be unconditionally
exercisable by the widow or her guardian and, upon her death,
by any person beneficially interested in her estate.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Regretfully, much costly litigation is to be anticipated on the dis-
allowance of the Florida dower interest from the federal estate tax marital
deduction. Immediate corrective state legislation is urgently needed to
qualify the interest. Since a retroactive deduction-saving amendment
could not, for federal estate tax purposes, provide the interest with non-
terminable characteristics as of the date of the husband's death,7 the
change should be made as soon as possible in order that maximum dower
benefits may be obtained for future widows.
70. This concern is manifested in FLA. STAT. § 731.34 (1965) which provides that dower
shall be free from the debts of the husband and the expenses incurred in the administration
of his estate.
71. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
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